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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EPA'S
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE
OF INDUSTRIAL EFFLUENT STANDARDS*
WESLEY A. MAGA T and W. KIP VISCUSI
Duke University
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the almost two decades since the initial wave of social regulation, the
academic literature documented very few, if any, instances of a health,
safety, or environmental regulation being an unqualified success. Indeed,
in most cases, the problem is even more fundamental. The typical analy-
sis of government regulation found that the regulation did not even fulfill
its primary mission, much less pass a more demanding benefit-cost test.
This absence of a well-documented case study of effective social regu-
lation may be due, in part, to the particular set of regulations selected for
analysis. There is certainly no inherent economic reason why such regula-
tions cannot play a productive role in our economy. In the case of envi-
ronmental quality, for example, the externality problems being addressed
are not handled well by markets, implying that government regulation has
at least the potential for playing a beneficial role. However, this potential
will not be realized if the regulations are ill conceived or not effectively
enforced, or if the environmental problem has no feasible solution.
A brief review of past regulatory experiences may be instructive to put
in better perspective the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) water
pollution control effort-the focus of this article. Most of these detailed
evaluations have been done with respect to agencies other than the EPA.
* This work was completed under two Cooperative Agreements from the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, one to Duke University (CR811902-02) and one to Northwestern
University (CR81302-01). We thank Alan Carlin, who was invaluable in facilitating the
research process, and the many people at the EPA who so kindly assisted us with obtaining
the data and understanding the agency's enforcement process. Anil Gaba provided superb
computer programming support, Mark Dreyfus assisted in the data collection, and an anony-
mous referee offered several useful suggestions.
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Although there have been some treatments of EPA regulations in the
academic literature,' as well as some assessments within the govern-
2ment, none of these evaluations have been undertaken with the same
degree of statistical rigor and detailed empirical analysis that characterize
analyses of health and safety regulations.
In large part, this lack of attention stems from the greater difficulty in
constructing an environmental data base. The decentralized nature of
polluting activity, some of which is clandestine, makes pollution levels
more difficult to monitor than compliance with, for example, safety cap
requirements. These difficulties posed for external evaluation may also
generate monitoring problems for the agency's enforcement staff. An
important issue to be addressed here is whether the prolonged process
required for us to amass a sound environmental data base for the purpose
of external analysis is a reflection of underlying intrinsic difficulties in the
monitoring and enforcement of EPA regulations.
The past assessments of health and safety regulations indicated that
regulations were ineffective in promoting their objectives for two general
reasons. The first is ineffectively designed regulatory policies. Thus, even
though there is compliance with the regulatory requirements, little or no
beneficial effect has been observed.
The seat belt requirements of the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration are one exhaustively studied instance. Since many drivers do
not use seat belts, and those that do may alter their driving habits, the
regulation has not produced the dramatic reduction in injuries and fa-
talities that the proponents of the regulation envisioned. Although some
studies suggest no significant effect,4 while others suggest a modest
beneficial effect,' the overall implication is that seat belts have not pro-
Robert W. Crandall, Controlling Industrial Pollution: The Economics and Politics of
Clean Air (1983); Paul MacAvoy, The Regulation of Air Pollutant Emissions from Plants and
Factories (1981); and B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests
Are Being Protected? 23 Econ. Inquiry 551 (1985), are excellent examples of such contribu-
tions.
2 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Wastewater Dischargers Are Not
Complying with EPA Pollution Control Permits (1983); and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Water Pollution: Application of National Cleanup Standards to the Pulp and Paper Industry
(March 1987).
3 See Crandall, supra note 1, for discussion of many of the problems confronted with
respect to air pollution data.
4 For data supporting this conclusion, see Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Auto Safety
Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 677 (1975).
5 Among the best of the optimistic assessments of seat belt regulations is that of Robert
W. Crandall and John D. Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior:
Some Empirical Estimates, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 328 (1984).
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duced large reductions in injury and fatality rates because those designing
the policy did not consider the crucial behavioral link involving drivers.
A similar effect has been observed with respect to the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission's safety requirements, 6 and, more generally, there
is evidence that consumer product safety regulations are not sufficiently
effective or extensive to substantially affect product safety. Manufactur-
ers have complied with the regulatory standards, but consumer safety has
not been enhanced.
Much the same story is true in the pharmaceutical area. Pharmacists
and doctors have complied with the U.S. prescription requirements for
drugs, with only occasional notable violations. Nevertheless, in terms of
the effect of prescriptions on health, no significant health effects of these
requirements have been observed- either for the United States or else-
where in the world.7
The second reason for regulatory failure is the lack of enforcement. For
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
extensive regulatory requirements but traditionally enforced them quite
laxly. Indeed, the inspection rates are so low (less than one inspection per
century per firm) and the penalties are so small (only $6 million annually)
that there are few incentives for compliance. The result is, at best, a very
modest effect on safety outcomes.8
The EPA water pollution regulations-the focus of this study-
represent an interesting departure from past patterns of regulatory failure.
First, the nature of the regulations-discharge limits-relates directly to
the policy objective of controlling pollution, and there is no potential for
offsetting behavioral responses. If the pollution standards are binding and
enforced, they should improve water quality. Second, the enforcement
effort is so extensive that enforcement should affect firms' compliance. In
the pulp and paper industry, which we will analyze, the EPA averages
roughly one inspection annually per major pollution source. In addition,
firms are required to file monthly discharge monitoring reports, providing
one of the most thorough monitoring capabilities of any health, safety, or
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety
Regulation, 18 J. Law & Econ. 527 (1985).
7 For supporting data, see Sam Peltzman, The Health Effects of Mandatory Prescrip-
tions, 30 J. Law & Econ. 2 (1987).
8 The most extensive analysis is that in W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational
Safety and Health Regulation, 1973-1983, 17 Rand J. Econ. 567 (1986). Analyses of earlier
periods of OSHA enforcement are provided in Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glen Thomas, Direct
and Indirect Effects of OSHA Regulations, 28 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1985), and in Robert S.
Smith, The Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injury Rates, 14 J. Human
Resources 145 (1979).
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environmental agency. Prior to the 1987 revisions of the Clean Water
Act, 9 one potential weak link was that EPA officials could not directly
assess penalties for noncompliance. They could, however, seek the im-
position of substantial penalties through court action.
In the subsequent sections, we describe the nature of the EPA enforce-
ment of water pollution regulations in the pulp and paper industry and the
original data base we created for this study. Using information from EPA
and industry sources, we constructed a longitudinal data base by firm,
permitting a detailed evaluation of the effects of EPA inspections and
their associated enforcement actions on the behavior of pulp and paper
plants. As the empirical results will indicate, we find diverse evidence of
significant EPA effects on the polluting and reporting activities of firms in
the pulp and paper industry.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF WATER POLLUTION REGULATIONS
IN THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY
In choosing to study the enforcement of environmental regulations by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and by state environmental
agencies, we could have chosen several different media. Only for water
pollution was it possible to find a relatively complete data base of pollu-
tion discharge measurements by source and a data base on enforcement
actions at these same plants. The same informational base that permits us
to provide a sound empirical analysis also assists the EPA in its effort to
monitor and enforce compliance. Overall, it is believed that more than 90
percent of all major water discharges are in compliance with EPA stan-
dards, as contrasted with estimated compliance rates as low as 20 percent
for toxic and hazardous substance regulation.10 Thus, one should be cau-
tious in generalizing from the EPA's record in water pollution to other
pollution problems. The investigation reported here should be regarded as
an examination of an important and representative component of one of
the EPA's most effective regulatory programs.
Since the data on inspections were much more complete than on other
enforcement actions, such as administrative orders, notices of violations,
9 Section 314 of the Federal Water Quality Act of 1987 authorizes the use of administra-
tive penalties that can be assessed directly by the EPA.
'0 For supporting data, see Cheryl Wasserman, Improving the Efficiency and Effec-
tiveness of Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policies, United
States: A National Review, Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development
(1984).
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warning letters, and telephone calls," we focus on the relationship be-
tween plant inspections and water pollution discharge levels. This empha-
sis on inspections also accords with our a priori views regarding the role
of different enforcement instruments since inspections are one of the most
important components of any enforcement program and thus merit special
attention.
To measure the relationship between inspections and subsequent com-
pliance, we examine one industry, pulp and paper. This industry is the
country's largest discharger of conventional pollutants, such as organic
waste and sediment,12 and has a long history of water pollution enforce-
ment efforts by various governmental agencies. There is no reason to
believe that the effectiveness of inspections in the pulp and paper industry
differs markedly from that in other industries regulated by the EPA. Also,
by concentrating on one industry, we avoid the problem of controlling for
interindustry differences in the stringency of regulations, differences in
the nature of the pollution, and differences in the technologies for com-
pliance.
The EPA traditionally focuses on the control of Biological Oxygen
Demand (BOD) because it is the most damaging conventional pollutant
discharged by the pulp and paper industry.' 3 Most inspections examine
BOD levels in addition to other pollutants of interest for a given plant.
Also, the technologies that control BOD discharges tend to reduce the
levels of other pollutants, which means that the relationship between
inspections and BOD discharge reductions ought to be similar to the
relationship between inspections and discharge reductions for other pol-
lutants.
The pulp and paper industry consists of hundreds of companies operat-
ing plants in thirty states within seven of the ten EPA regions in the
country. The EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) data base described
below lists 418 separate sources of pollutant discharge in the industry.
Biological Oxygen Demand, Total Suspended Solids (TSS), and the pH
levels of discharges are the three main conventional pollutants controlled,
although in recent years Congress has initiated new regulatory efforts to
also control toxic pollutants.
11 One reason for the completeness of the data on inspections is that the EPA regional
offices are not credited with conducting an inspection until it is coded into the central data
base. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water Enforcement, NPDES
Inspection Manual, at iii (June 1984).
12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Water Pollution, supra note 2, at 8.
13 BOD is the standard measure of the organic pollutant content of water.
HeinOnline  -- 33 J.L. & Econ. 335 1990
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
If the EPA set water pollution standards in the same manner as seat belt
regulations or OSHA standards, a description of the regulatory con-
straints would be straightforward. In the seat belt and OSHA cases, firms
face well-defined requirements on the technology or work environment.
All firms must comply with the same set of regulations, such as ensuring
that punch presses have the specified guards. There has been little change
over time in the nature of the standards, except that some new regulations
have been added. In contrast, EPA water pollution standards involve
permissible pollution amounts that vary across firms and over time.
The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments set the
framework for regulation on industrial water pollution. The act required
that all sources discharging into the navigable waters of the country meet
discharge standards based on the application of the "best practicable
control technology" (BPT) by July 1, 1977, while complying with stan-
dards based on the "best available technology economically achievable"
(BAT) by July 1, 1983.
In 1977 the act was amended again, pushing back the 1983 deadline to
July 1, 1984, and substituting a more complicated requirement. Conven-
tional pollutants such as BOD and TSS were to meet standards based on
the adoption of the best conventional technology (BCT), while toxic pol-
lutants were to meet standards based on the best available technology
(BAT).
The final BPT and BAT standards for various subcategories of the pulp
and paper industry were promulgated on three separate dates: May 9,
1974; May 29, 1974; and January 6, 1977. The final BCT standards were
issued on December 17, 1986, and left the BPT standards for BOD control
unchanged. The BPT standards generally set limitations on the quantities
of BOD that a plant could discharge per pound of pulp or paper pro-
duced.1 4 However, the allowable discharges of BOD from each source
were derived by multiplying this effluent limitation by the number of
pounds of pulp or paper produced per day at the plant. This latter number
formed the basis of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit required of each discharger. Since our empirical study
covers the period from the first quarter of 1982 through the first quarter of
1985, the NPDES permits restricting BOD discharge were based on the
1977 BPT standards.
The EPA possesses the authority to issue the NPDES permits, but the
authority has been delegated to thirty-seven states meeting specified fed-
14 For a formal description and analysis of the BPT rule-making process, see Wesley A.
Magat et al., Rules in the Making: A Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior
(1986).
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eral criteria. States approved to issue NPDES permits also assume re-
sponsibility for their enforcement, which means inspecting the plants and
taking action against sources found to be out of compliance. For states
not app.oved to run their own permit systems, the EPA issues and en-
forces the permits.
An important aspect of the permit process should be emphasized. The
EPA and the states do not set uniform permit levels irrespective of the
industry characteristics associated with the pollution source. Each stan-
dard is industry specific and represents pollution levels that are poten-
tially achievable with available technologies.
Each source must regularly measure its pollution discharge levels and
report its actual discharges of each pollutant in its permit on a monthly
basis through a Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR). If a source is out of
compliance with the effluent standards in its permit, it is also required to
file a noncompliance report. The states and EPA regional offices send the
DMRs to the EPA, which enters them into the PCS data base to serve as a
basis for tracking compliance. In addition, the EPA requires that Quar-
terly Non-compliance Reports (QNCR) be filed by each state and region
to identify sources out of compliance. In the empirical study that follows,
we use the reported BOD discharge levels in the DMRs to measure the
effects of inspections on BOD discharge levels.
Because the sources are required to report their pollutant discharge
levels on a monthly basis, the on-site inspections play a somewhat differ-
ent role than inspections carried out by other regulatory agencies, such as
an OSHA inspection of an industrial site. The latter inspections constitute
the primary basis for the agency to check compliance with its regulations
and to have a visible presence in the workplace. In contrast, EPA or state-
run inspections of industrial water pollution sources create a similar vis-
ible presence, but they provide only a secondary source of information
about compliance because the monthly DMRs address the compliance
question directly. Some NPDES permit inspections do test whether the
DMR discharge levels are reported accurately and honestly, and they
provide an incentive for firms to submit DMRs more frequently.
The difference between EPA inspections and OSHA inspections has
also been narrowing over the years. Although the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics does not release the mandated injury reports to OSHA for compliance
purposes, OSHA now gathers this information through on-site records
checks to target its inspections. This procedure represents a partial and
more time-consuming variant of the DMR process. Firms with good in-
jury records are exempt from OSHA inspections.
The EPA inspections directly address one or more of the following
items: the existence of an up-to-date permit, the installation of the abate-
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ment equipment necessary for compliance with the permit, management
plans and practices, the preparation and maintenance of records, the
correct operation of the abatement equipment, and the conduct of sam-
pling and sample analysis. As a recent EPA report to the Organization for
Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) explains, "Despite
widespread self-monitoring, inspections remain the backbone of agency
compliance monitoring programs .... inspections are the government's
main tool for officially assessing compliance, and for assuring quality
control and lending credibility to self-monitoring programs. The indepen-
dent evaluation provided by a government inspection is the key."
5
The EPA carries out three main types of inspections-compliance sam-
pling inspections, compliance evaluation inspections, and performance
audit inspections. Compliance sampling inspections require approxi-
mately thirty workdays of time to complete and involve actual sampling of
the effluent at the plant, as well as an examination of the company's
record-keeping system, its testing procedures, and its treatment system.
In contrast, the compliance evaluation inspections take only about three
workdays to complete. They involve no sampling, but the inspectors do
examine the company's treatment facilities, monitoring methods, and
records. The performance audit inspections require about twelve days to
complete and consist of the same practices used in the compliance evalua-
tion inspection, plus observation of the permittee going through the steps
in the self-monitoring process from sample collection and flow measure-
ment through laboratory analyses, data workup, and reporting. In addi-
tion, the performance audit inspector may leave a check sample for the
permittee to analyze.
Based on the discharge reports in the DMRs and in the QNCRs, as well
as on the findings of inspections, the EPA or the approved state agencies
take enforcement actions against violators. Informal actions include tele-
phone calls, warning letters, and notices of violation, as well as inspec-
tions. If these measures do not achieve the intended results, the control
agencies can proceed with formal actions such as administrative orders,
permit revision, formal listing of companies as ineligible for govern-
ment contracts, grants, and loans; and, finally, civil and criminal judicial
responses.
Court action is a lengthy process involving the Justice Department that
is started only as a last resort. Under Section 309(e) of the 1977 Clean
Water Act, civil penalties could have been awarded up to a level of
$10,000 per day, while criminal penalties could have ranged from $2,500
" Wasserman, supra note 10, at 111-7.
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to $25,000 for the first violation and up to $50,000 for the second viola-
tion.16 In addition, first violations could have led to imprisonment of up
to one year, with up to two years of imprisonment for the second viola-
tion. During the period from January 1, 1975, to July I, 1985, the EPA
commenced 64 judicial actions in the pulp and paper industry. Of these,
42 cases resulted in fines, and four were still pending at the end of the
period. The fines varied from $1,500 to $750,000, with an average of
$89,437. Because the regions lacked the incentives to report regularly
enforcement actions other than inspections into the PCS data base, we
concentrate our study on the effectiveness of the inspections on bringing
firms into compliance with their permits.
The inspections variable is intended to be a proxy for the overall en-
forcement effort associated with an inspection and all subsequent en-
forcement actions. The financial penalties associated with noncompliance
may be much greater than is indicated by the fines actually assessed since
these fines do not reflect the potential losses due to noncompliance. In-
deed, to take the extreme case, if the sanctions were so great that enforce-
ment effort was fully effective, no instances of noncompliance or penalty
assessments would be observed. The enforcement measure to be used in
the regression equations should reflect the expected sanctions, not the
level of sanctions observed after the deterrence effect has operated. The
EPA inspections variable will serve both as a measure of the formal
contact of the EPA with each firm as well as the institutional trigger that
will generate additional enforcement sanctions for noncomplying firms.
III. THE SAMPLE AND THE VARIABLES
The Data Base
The PCS data base, which we utilize in our analysis, lists 418 separate
sources in the pulp and paper industry in its Inspections file. Under half of
these sources-194-had BOD discharges. Of this group, seventy-seven
submitted DMR measurements for BOD discharge into the Measurement
file. As a result, the data set that we used includes seventy-seven of the
194 major sources of BOD in the pulp and paper industry.
The information that is missing was not governed by an entirely random
process. The sources that were not included either did not enter their
DMRs into the PCS data base, or they did not submit DMRs including
16 Under the Federal Water Quality Act of 1987, the maximum civil penalty rose to
$25,000 per day and the maximum criminal penalty increased to $50,000 for the first violation
and $100,000 for the second violation.
HeinOnline  -- 33 J.L. & Econ. 339 1990
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
NUMBER OF FIRMS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
EPA REGION
SAMPLE E POPULATION
FIGURE 1.-Sample and population firms by EPA region; N = 194
BOD measurements during the period under study, or they discharged
pollutants other than BOD.
The principal factor affecting the missing sources is the time required
before the records could be computerized. Officials at the EPA believe
that most of the other sources not in the PCS data base did submit DMR
data to the EPA or the states, but they were not entered into the PCS data
base because the system was not yet operational and the states and re-
gions were not required to enter the data.17 This view is consistent with
the regional patterns of sources included in our data base. Seven of the
nine EPA regions with pulp and paper mills are represented in our data
base (see Figure 1). In addition, nineteen of the twenty-seven states with
17 This view is based on discussions with EPA analysts most familiar with the PCS data
base and the pulp and paper industry. Even though some of the states did not have the
capability to enter the DMR data into the PCS data base, they regularly screened the data
and summarized them in the QNCRs.
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE AND POPULATION BY STATE
Firms in Firms in
State Sample Population
Alaska 1 2
Alabama 0 10
Arkansas 8 8
California 0 2
Florida 8 9
Idaho I I
Iowa 0 2
Illinois 2 3
Indiana 1 4
Kentucky 3 3
Louisiana 9 13
Maryland 0 1
Massachusetts 3 16
Minnesota 1 5
Missouri 0 3
New Hampshire 5 1I
New Jersey 1 10
New York 0 21
North Carolina 0 4
Ohio 4 9
Oklahoma 3 3
Oregon 7 14
Pennsylvania 5 10
Puerto Rico 0 !
Tennessee 1 2
Texas 6 9
Washington 8 18
pulp and paper mills are captured in the sample (see Table 1). The princi-
pal selectivity process is that some states and two EPA regions did not
computerize their DMR reports by 1982:1. If computerization is posi-
tively correlated with more effective enforcement (which we have no way
of knowing and no a priori reason to suspect), our empirical results will
tend to overstate the effectiveness of water pollution enforcement overall.
However, it should be noted that, even if there is a selectivity bias, it
should create much less bias than a scenario in which the firms missing
from the data base were determined on a firm-by-firm basis based on the
quality of the DMR data supplied by each firm.
The firms in our sample tend to be larger than those without data.
Available data on 170 out of the 194 pulp and paper plants show that the
mean output level of firms in the sample is 62 percent higher than those
outside the sample and that 54 percent of the industry output is produced
by the firms in our sample. We do not have the data to measure the share
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of industry pollution discharges from our sample, but to the extent that
output levels are correlated with pollution discharge levels, about half of
the industry BOD discharges would have been produced by the firms in
our sample.
Thus, based on the available evidence, we conclude that our sample
comprising 40 percent of the firms and 54 percent of the output in the
industry is representative of the entire pulp and paper industry, except to
the extent that there is some relationship between the effectiveness of
inspections and either firm size or the decision by states or EPA regional
offices to enter discharge data in the PCS data base. If these two factors
are for some reason correlated with the effectiveness of inspections, then
our results need to be interpreted as estimates of the response to EPA
inspections of firms whose discharge levels are regularly reported to the
EPA's national data base.
The firms represented in our sample are all located within Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) 26. We have further divided this industry
characterization into five four-digit SIC codes (2611, 2621, 2631, 2648, and
2661). 18 For the period from the first quarter of 1982 through the first
quarter of 1985 there were 276 inspections of the sources in the sample, of
which 43 percent were compliance sampling and 57 percent were com-
pliance evaluation.
In this analysis we use calendar quarters as the unit of analysis. Only
rarely was there more than one inspection for a given source in the same
quarter. Despite the requirement that sources report DMRs every month
to the state enforcement agency or the EPA, for the reasons explained
above, some DMR measurements are missing for the sources in our sam-
ple. In constructing the quarterly BOD measurements for our statistical
analysis, we interpolated to fill in missing values and used averages of the
BOD discharge levels within a quarter as the quarterly average BOD
discharge levels.
Although the EPA analysts to whom we talked were confident that
most of the discharge measurements in the DMRs were reported accu-
rately, permittees do have several opportunities to cheat. They may
choose not to report discharge measurements during months with un-
usually high discharge levels. This behavior would lead to some smooth-
ing of the pattern of reported discharges, eliminating the top end of the
18 The sample of seventy-seven sources matches the full set of pulp and paper sources
fairly closely in terms of the distribution of sources across regions, the mix of products
across the four-digit SIC codes, and the frequency of plant inspections in each quarter. The
only differences of note were that regions 6 and 10 are somewhat overrepresented, while
region 2 is underrepresented, and the sample firms were inspected about 25 percent more
often.
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distribution. More active attempts to mislead EPA include altering the
contents of the sample being tested, falsely calibrating the test instru-
ments, and recording false measurements in the DMRs.
Despite these possibilities for sending the EPA misleading or false
DMR discharge statistics, there are several incentives to report honest
information in the DMRs. The EPA follows the policy of attempting to
inspect all major sources at least once a year. Compliance sampling in-
spections would detect whether most of the reported measurements were
inconsistent with the measurements from the inspections, but they could
not detect whether outliers were removed from the reports. Compliance
evaluation inspections would detect the absence of the required abate-
ment equipment, but would be less useful in evaluating whether the abate-
ment systems were being operated correctly. Of course, the penalties for
noncompliance and fraud in reporting also create incentives for truthful
reporting of discharge measurements. The possibility of leaks to EPA by
disgruntled employees makes this last incentive more compelling to firms
considering manipulating their DMR data.
Taking into account the possibility that the DMR measurements may
measure true compliance status with some error, it is still instructive to
ascertain how well firms comply with the effluent regulations. Recently,
the Environmental Protection Agency' 9 issued a study of compliance by
all the major pulp and paper mills (SIC 2611, 2621, 2631) in the eight
southeastern states comprising EPA region 4 over the period from the
second quarter of fiscal year 1982 through the first quarter of fiscal year
1984. Eighty-two percent of the measurements fell within the permitted
bounds. This compares with 75 percent of the measurements from the
pulp and paper firms in our sample being in compliance. The EPA further
defines significant noncompliance for BOD as violations of the monthly
average permit limits for any two months in a six-month period that
exceed the limit by 40 percent, or violations of the monthly average limits
for any four months in a six-month period. Using this definition, 94 per-
cent of the measurements indicated discharge levels not in significant
noncompliance. The study also showed that four out of the fifty-six mills
created most of the instances of significant noncompliance.2 °
'9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Study of Pulp and Paper Industry in Region IV
(1986).
20 In light of the low fines assessed and the relative infrequency of inspections, some
readers may question the reasons for the high compliance rates. While our study addresses
only the incremental effect of inspections and associated enforcement actions on com-
pliance, we can speculate on the explanation for the high base rate of compliance.
In a well-functioning regulatory system, one would not expect to see frequent use of
strong sanctions, such as fines, for firms complying with regulations in order to avoid the
sanctions. It is only necessary that firms believe they will be sanctioned if they fail to
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TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES DESCRIBING SEVENTY-SEVEN PLANTS
IN SAMPLE (1982:1-1985:1)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation
MQAVG (pounds per day) 5,758.288 8,919.173
MVIO (I = out of compliance) .252 .434
IQTRI (I = inspection one quarter prior
to measurement) .248 .432
IQTR2 .273 .446
IQTR3 .273 .446
IQTR4 .281 .450
IQTR5 .300 .458
IQTR6 .295 .456
REGNI (I = source located in
region 1) .095 .293
REGN2 .002 .039
REGN3 .064 .244
REGN4 .154 .361
REGN5 .039 .193
REGN6 .435 .496
REGN7 .000 .000
REGN8 .000 .000
REGN9 .000 .000
REGNIO .213 .410
SICII (I = pulp mill) .241 .428
SIC21 (I = paper mill excluding building) .432 .496
SIC31 (I = paperboard mill) .253 .435
SIC48 (1 = 7 stationary products) .014 .117
SIC61 (I = building paper or paperboard
mill) .048 .214
TONS (daily output rate) 794.156 587.083
Sample Characteristics
Table 2 summarizes the means and standard deviations for the sample
of the variables used in our analysis. The sample is a pooled time series
and cross section of seventy-seven plants followed on a quarterly basis
from 1982:1 to 1985:1. The first two variables represent the pollution
outcome measures that will be of primary interest as dependent variables
comply. Despite their infrequent use, there are a variety of punishments that the EPA can
impose, short of judicial fines. For firms that do not comply, the agency can raise the
frequency and intensity of inspections, write permits using stricter interpretations of the
regulations (for example, using average rather than maximum production rates to calculate
allowed discharge levels), deny operating permits, subject the firm to bad publicity, and
engage in protracted haggling, and possibly prolonged litigation, which imposes high costs in
terms of legal fees, management time, and general uncertainty about being allowed to
operate.
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in different equations. The variable MQAVG is a continuous measure of
the extent of pollution. It measures the number of pounds of BOD dis-
charged per day, where this amount is averaged over the quarter. Al-
though the amount of pollution is a variable of substantial economic inter-
est, it is not the sole variable of concern. Different firms may have
different permitted pollution levels so that, for example, a large plant may
be in compliance with a high BOD level whereas a small plant may be in
violation of its permit even though its discharge is less. Analyzing the
effect of inspections on total discharges is, however, one of the most
important ways of assessing the benefits of the EPA's regulatory enforce-
ment.
The second pollution variable, MVIO, is a discrete zero or one variable
that takes on a value of one if the pollution source is in noncompliance
with its BOD discharge permit in any of its monthly measurements that
quarter. This variable best captures whether the firm's performance is in
compliance with its water pollution permit, but it does not reflect the
extent of noncompliance. Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct a
reliable measure of the amount of pollution in excess of the permitted
amount since data pertaining to the level specified in the permit are not
available from the PCS data base. Instead, we are restricted to MQAVG
and MVIO rather than a hybrid of a continuous pollution measure and
discrete compliance measure.
The next set of variables is a series of zero or one dummy variables
pertaining to whether the firm was inspected in a particular quarter. The
variable IQTRJ is of the general form in which it takes on a value of one if
the pollution source received an inspection J quarters previous to the
pollution measurement in the current quarter, where J takes on a value
from one to six. It is quite striking that the rate of inspection is quite high,
on the order of 25-30 percent per quarter.
This relatively high inspection rate distinguishes the EPA enforcement
effort from that of OSHA. Not only does the EPA receive regular dis-
charge monitoring reports from firms, but it also undertakes water pollu-
tion inspections at a rate of about one inspection annually per major
pollution source. In contrast, OSHA has no automatic data feedback
mechanism, and it has a much more sporadic inspections effort. In
OSHA's early years, some analysts equated OSHA's inspection fre-
quency to other rare events such as the annual chance of seeing Halley's
comet. At present, the OSHA inspection rate is much lower than this
amount-on the order of 1/200 for each firm in any year. 2' The intensity of
21 See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks, in Regulatory
Reform: What Actually Happened 259 (L. Weiss and M. Klass eds. 1986).
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EPA inspections consequently dwarfs that of OSHA inspections so that
there is no reason to believe that the lack of efficacy of OSHA's minimal
enforcement operation has any adverse implications for the EPA's
chances of success.
The variables of the form REGNJ are zero or one dummy variables for
the EPA region J in which the plant is located. These variables will be
utilized to ascertain whether there are any important regional differences
in pollution patterns. It should be noted that there are no pulp and paper
mills located in three of the EPA regions (7, 8, and 9) and there are no PCS
data on mills in region 2.
The next set of six variables are of the form SICJK, which represents a
dummy variable for the plant's four-digit SIC industry code 26JK, where
JK takes on the values 11, 21, 31,48, and 61. Although all firms are in the
pulp and paper industry, it was desirable to also include refined industry-
group dummy variables that reflect the firm's specific operations and
technology. For example, pulp mills (SIC 2641) have different operations
than converted paper plants (SIC 2649).
The final variable listed is TONS. It measures the number of tons of
pulp and paper produced daily at the plant. Unlike the other variables in
the data set, this variable was not included in the PCS data base. We
matched each firm to a capacity measure using data provided in a pub-
lished industry directory.22
IV. THE EFFECT OF INSPECTIONS ON POLLUTION
The major purpose of this article is to measure empirically the effects of
inspections, along with their associated enforcement actions, on the be-
havior of firms in the pulp and paper industry. We will concentrate on an
econometric approach that relates the conduct of an inspection in a given
quarter to two measures of the firm's BOD abatement effort: (1) its abso-
lute rate of effluent discharge (MQAVG), and (2) whether its discharge
rate falls below its permitted level (MVIO). We also examine the effect of
plant inspections on reducing the incidence of nonreporting of DMR data.
To the extent that firms purposely refrain from reporting discharge levels
during periods of noncompliance, the first two measures of the effect of
inspections would be biased toward less effect than what actually oc-
curred. This third measure allows us to determine whether inspections
improved the completeness of the EPA's discharge monitoring system
that presumably lead to more discovery of noncompliance and, through
22 See Lockwood's Directory of the Paper & Allied Trades (1983 ed.).
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subsequent enforcement efforts, further reductions in pollutant discharge
levels.
Empirical Framework for Measuring Abatement Effects
The underlying economic framework is straightforward, as pollution
levels are governed by a capital investment process relating to the pollu-
tion control technology, as well as by the efficiency levels at which the
abatement equipment is operated. The role of EPA inspections is to raise
the expected cost of noncompliance, boosting the incentives for pollution
reduction and compliance with the permit. Since the underlying theoret-
ical basis is straightforward, we will proceed directly to the estimating
equations.2 3
The equations to be estimated will be of the same general form whether
the pollution variable is MQAVG or MVIO. To illustrate this general
form, let POLLUTION, be the value of the pollution variable MQAVG
or MVIO for pollution source i in period t. Some additional notation is
needed before we can write down the equation to be estimated. The
variable IQTRJi, is the zero or one inspection variable for whether pollu-
tion source i was inspected in period t - J, TONSi is source i's capacity
measure, SICi is a vector of four-digit SIC-code dummy variables for
pollution source i, REGNi is a vector of dummy variable for the EPA
regions for source i, and QUARTER, is a vector of dummy variables for
the quarters. The resulting estimating equation is of the form
n
POLLUTIONi, = ot + P1 POLLUTIONi,- 4 + 3 _Yk IQTR,-k
k=
+ 032TONSi + 033SICi + P34REGNi
+ P35QUARTER, + vi,,
where vi, is a random error term. In the case of the continuous pollution
measure, MQAVG, ordinary least squares is the appropriate estimator,
whereas for the discrete compliance variable, MVIO, a logistic estimation
procedure is employed. With some modifications, this equation is in the
same general spirit as similar equations estimated for safety regulations.
2 4
The first variable included is the lagged dependent variable, with the
noteworthy distinction that the lag is four quarters rather than one. The
23 The model implicit here is articulated more fully for the analogous job safety case in W.
Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 10 Bell J. Econ. 117
(1979). More generally, see Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986).
24 The equation bears closest similarity to those in Viscusi, supra note 8.
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variable POLLUTIONi,_ 4 is a proxy for the firm's stock of capital related
to pollution control and for the general character of its abatement technol-
ogy. Firms with high levels of pollution in the past are likely to continue to
have high levels in the future because the nature of their control technol-
ogy makes it costly to achieve pollution reductions. A four-quarter lag is
utilized rather than a single-quarter lag to capture the seasonality that
often plays an important role in a firm's operations. The products pro-
duced, stream flow conditions, and the pollution permit amount may vary
by season.
The lagged dependent variable serves an additional role with respect to
regression-to-the-mean effects. It is possible that firms with an abnor-
mally high pollution level in period t due to stochastic factors will be
inspected in period t + 1 and improve their performance compared with
period t, wholly apart from any true inspection effect. Because the lagged
values captures pollution levels, or compliance status, four quarters ear-
lier, however, they are less susceptible to leading to inspection variable
results that simply capture regression-to-the-mean effects.
The next set of variables is a distributed lag on past EPA inspections.
Evidence for OSHA suggests that there is generally a lag before firms can
make the required capital investments to alter their performance level. 25
Even if compliance only entails changes in operating procedures fol-
lowing an inspection, an effect may not be apparent until the next quarter.
Consider a situation in which the firm files its DMR data for the first
month of the quarter in the middle of the second month of the quarter.
Even if the EPA undertakes an inspection immediately, which is not
usually the case, the sampling will not be completed until the middle of
the final month of the quarter. Thus, under this best-case scenario only
half a month, or one-sixth, of the pollution discharges for the quarter will
be affected by the inspection. Because of time lags before the EPA re-
ceives the DMR data, the time needed before the EPA can schedule an
inspector to make a plant visit, the rather lengthy inspection process, and
the time needed before the EPA makes its report to the firm and the firm
can take action on it, no contemporaneous effect is expected.
Before requiring that any inspection effect enter with a lag, we empiri-
cally tested for whether the inspection variable led to a contemporaneous
negative effect on pollution. Rather than a negative effect, we observed a
strong and statistically significant positive influence, consistent with the
reverse causality hypothesis. We explored the causality issue in greater
detail. Based on a Hausman2 6 specification test, we were able to reject the
25 Id.
26 Jerry Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 Econometrica 1251 (1978).
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hypothesis that the IQTR, variable is exogenous. Attempts to replace
IQTRit (t = 0) by an instrumental variable estimator also led to positive
coefficients, suggesting that the primary relationship between the two
variables is through high current levels of pollution leading to EPA in-
spections, rather than inspections causing immediate reductions in pollu-
tion discharge levels. These results allow us to use only lagged inspection
variables without losing any of the effects of the inspections on com-
pliance or creating a bias in our estimated coefficients.
The next variable, TONS,, pertains to the capacity of the firm. Other
things being equal, firms with larger capacity should produce more pollu-
tion, MQAVG, but need not necessarily be more likely to be in or out of
compliance with EPA standards. There may be economies of scale with
respect to pollution control that would tend to make large firms less likely
to be out of compliance. Similarly, the TONS variable may pick up fac-
tors related to the vintage of the technology to the extent that larger plants
are newer and have less polluting technologies. If these large plants are
considerably more efficient in controlling pollution, the absolute levels of
pollution may be lower than smaller and more outmoded facilities.
Technological factors of this type will also be captured in the SIC-code
dummy variables, implying that differences in technologies and standards
across parts of the pulp and paper industry will be taken into account. The
regional dummy variables REGNJ also capture firm characteristics to
some extent since plants in some regions tend to be older than those in
other regions. These regional variables also reflect regional differences in
standard setting and the nature of enforcement. These differences may be
considerable due to the prominent role that the states have in the enforce-
ment process.
The final set of variables is a series of twelve quarterly dummy vari-
ables for all but one, of the quarters represented. This formulation was
chosen over a simple time-trend variable because of its greater flexibility.
Not only do the QUARTER, variables capture any possible uniform time
trend, but they also capture other quarter-specific effects such as any
seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in production levels and water flows.
Although some quarterly dummy variables were statistically significant,
these coefficients are not reported since there was no apparent pattern
evident in the results. In addition, we regressed MQAVG against both a
continuous TIME variable and its square but found no significant relation-
ships.
Regression and Maximum Likelihood Results
Table 3 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) results for the continu-
ous pollution measure, MQAVG, and Table 4 reports the maximum likeli-
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR MQAVG (Quarterly Average BOD Discharge Levels in
Pounds per Day)
INDEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS
VARIABLES (1)* (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT
MQAVG4
IQTRI
IQTR2
IQTR3
IQTR4
IQTR5
IQTR6
TONS
SICII
SIC21
SIC31
SIC48
REGNI
REGN3
REGN4
REGN5
REGN6
Adjusted R 2
N
- 434.029
(1,683.935)
.983
(.021)
- 1,174.689
(517.225)
575.256
(495.099)
- 198.047
(467.133)
77.479
(468.403)
374.924
(468.248)
- 584.136
(440.411)
.322
(.438)
414.177
(1,408.440)
262.356
(1,418.355)
- 205.950
(1,426.645)
31.976
(2,806.433)
248.482
(909.025)
- 499.882
(1,864.535)
230.897
(890.368)
59.067
(1,298.116)
276.987
(625.214)
.903
373
NoTE.-Each equation also includes twelve quarterly dummy variables. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
* Equation (I) uses a second-order polynomial distributed lag formulation for IQTRI-IQTR6.
-460.454
(1,650.046)
.983
(.021)
- 1,059.423
(511.525)
381.999
(481.687)
- 155.912
(463.305)
59.709
(450.159)
.320
(.439)
382.955
(1,408.522)
219.433
(1,414.941)
-278.427
(1,424.948)
-41.814
(2,789.052)
225.870
(895.892)
- 500.628
(1,823.241)
219.572
(846.406)
107.966
(1,299.413)
269.784
(611.374)
.903
373
-494.034
(1,592.309)
.983
(.020)
- 1,064.031
(497.787)
398.665
(469.908)
.320
(.437)
410.222
(1,394.943)
252.081
(1,393.285)
-253.484
(1,410.265)
17.162
(2,719.955)
213.567
(862.661)
- 533.588
(1,764.428)
204.147
(807.680)
115.888
(1,295.674)
265.636
(597.714)
.904
373
-213.905
(1,557.062)
.982
(.020)
- 1,148.911
(487.430)
.329
(.437)
310.442
(1,389.408)
112.177
(1,382.926)
-365.172
(1,403.533)
- 241.752
(2,701.675)
322.009
(852.791)
-360.471
(1,751.873)
310.894
(797.493)
147.361
(1,294.613)
307.939
(595.387)
.904
373
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TABLE 4
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD EQUATIONS FOR MVIO (Noncompliance with BOD Standards)
COEFFICIENTS
NOTE.-Each equation also includes twelve quarterly variables. Asymptotic standard errors are in
parentheses.
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE (1)
INTERCEPT -7.872
(23.008)
MVIOT4 2.650
(.362)
IQTRI -1.12
(.442)
IQTR2 - .063
(.421)
IQTR3 - .606
(.398)
IQTR4 - .030
(.387)
IQTR5 .448
(.389)
IQTR6 .071
(.360)
TONS -5.07 x 10
- 4
(4 x 10 - 4 )
SICII 6.321
(22.998)
SIC21 5.800
(22.999)
SIC31 5.352
(23.00)
SIC48 2.506
(23.077)
REGNI 1.709
(.746)
REGN3 2.188
(1.481)
REGN4 1.098
(.685)
REGN5 1.835
(.888)
REGN6 - .531
(.524)
- 2(log L) 281.30
N 374
(2)
-7.648
(22.884)
2.637
(.359)
- 1.019
(.429)
-. 134
(.411)
-. 644
(.396)
-. 141
(.369)
4.971 x 10
- 4
(3.956 x 10 - 4)
6.263
(22.875)
5.754
(22.876)
5.306
(22.877)
2.404
(22.95 1)
1.791
(.736)
2.474
(1.412)
1.316
(.655)
1.868
(.889)
- .404
(.505)
282.64
374
(3)
-7.991
(22.884)
2.640
(.356)
-. 920
(.418)
-. 037
(.396)
-5.127 x 10
- 4
(3.913 X 10- 4 )
6.396
(23.108)
5.958
(23.109)
5.423
(23.110)
3.064
(23.178)
1.540
(.690)
2.033
(1.336)
1.101
(.621)
1.951
(.877)
- .530
(.482)
285.35
374
(4)
-8.012
(23.113)
2.641
(.356)
- .914
(.413)
-5.124" x 10 - 4
(3.91 x 10- 4)
6.405
(23.106)
5.968
(23.107)
5.431
(23.109)
3.084
(23.175)
1.531
(.683)
2.015
(1.319)
1.094
(.615)
1.950
(.876)
-. 535
(.480)
285.39
374
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hood estimates for the noncompliance variable, MVIO. Because of the
close similarity of the findings, we discuss each of the variables in turn for
both of the tables.
The four-quarter lagged pollution variable has the expected strong posi-
tive effect on the current pollution status, which suggests that past pollu-
tion levels predict current discharge levels accurately because of the
slowness of the capital expenditures process needed to transform their
status. Since the MVIO variable has been altered by the logistic transfor-
mation, the results for the continuous pollution measure, MQAVG, can
be interpreted more readily. It is quite striking that the weight placed on
the four-quarter lagged pollution value is in excess of 0.98 in each of the
four equations. Thus, there is almost complete replication of the pollution
experience across time. All else being equal (in particular, controlling for
inspections), past pollution performance is close to a perfect predictor of
current pollution levels.
The next set of variables pertains to the set of lagged inspection vari-
ables. Consider the continuous discharge measurements in Table 3. In
equation (1) there is a second-order polynomial distributed lag over in-
spection variables for the preceding six quarters, equation (2) is a free-
form lag over four quarters, equation (3) is a free-form lag over two
quarters, and equation (4) includes only a single lagged value. The pattern
is strikingly similar in all four equations. There is a consistently significant
and substantial influenc& of IQTR on reducing discharge levels that oc-
curs with a one-quarter lag. Lagged values of more than a quarter are not
consequential. The discrete compliance status equations in Table 4 con-
vey the same influence of inspections; that is, they cause significant re-
ductions in the rate of noncompliance in the subsequent quarter. 27
The magnitude of the inspection effect is substantial. Consider equation
(4) in Table 3. Each inspection reduces the value of MQAVG by 1,149
pounds per day, which represents about a 20 percent reduction in the
mean value of BOD discharges. 2 Since the coefficients of subsequent
IQTR variables are never significantly positive, there is no evidence of a
27 Our results suggest that inspections tend to induce reduced discharge levels and en-
hanced compliance through immediate attention to better plant operation and maintenance,
rather than longer-term capital investments. This finding is consistent with the observation
in Wasserman, supra note 10, that the EPA's main enforcement problems in the water
pollution area involve failure to operate and maintain treatment systems already in place
rather than investment in new treatment systems.
28 A paper by Jonathan S. Feinstein (Detection-controlled Inference (working paper,
M.I.T., Dep't of Econ., 1986) provides an econometric argument for why the coefficients of
the inspection variables would be biased downward if detection of noncompliance were
masked by the nonsubmittal of DMR data. Thus, our results about the effect of inspections
provide a lower bound on their true magnitude.
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significant postinspection rebound in pollution discharge levels. These
results imply that a permanent improvement in discharge levels takes
place as a consequence of the inspection and all associated enforcement
actions. Further, the 1,149 pounds per day reduction in BOD in period t is
reflected in an approximately equal reduction four quarters hence because
the coefficient of MQAVG4 is 0.982. Thus, inspections substantially re-
duce BOD discharges after about one quarter, and they have a permanent
effect on reducing the firm's future pollution levels.29
The compliance status results from Table 4 also indicate a large effect
of the inspections, and their associated enforcement actions, on noncom-
pliance rates. The coefficients of IQTR1 in equations (1)-(4) average
- 1.0, implying that had the source not been inspected its odds of being in
noncompliance would have been about double. Since most plants in the
sample were inspected about once a year and the average rate of noncom-
pliance is 25 percent, the coefficients from the table suggest that without
an inspection this noncompliance rate would have been 48 percent.
Finally, the TONS measure has the expected sign in each case, as firms
with larger capacity have higher total levels of pollution and lower
chances of being out of compliance. Neither effect is statistically signifi-
cant, however. Similarly, the SIC and regional dummy variables fail to
yield any statistically significant effects.
One might expect that the magnitude of the inspection effect would
vary with the firm's present noncompliance status. To test this hy-
pothesis, Table 5 presents the key coefficients for equations (3) and (4)
from Table 3 in which the inspection variables have been interacted with
the compliance status at the time of the inspection. In particular, IPVIOl
equals one in a quarter when a source was inspected one quarter earlier
and had a permit violation when it was inspected; otherwise it equals
zero. IPNOVIOI equals one in a quarter when a source was inspected one
quarter earlier and did not have a permit violation during the quarter of
the inspection, and zero otherwise. Similar definitions apply to IPVIO2
and IPNOVIO2, except that these variables have a two-quarter lag.
The results in Table 5 indicate effects of inspections with a one-quarter
lag, but no significant effects with a two-quarter lag. Both the IPVIO1
variable (1 percent confidence level, one-tailed test) and the IPNOVIO1
variable (5 percent confidence level, one-tailed test) are statistically sig-
29 When the inspection variables were redefined to separate the effects of compliance
sampling inspections from the effects of compliance evaluation inspections (without sam-
pling), we found no significant differences between the effects of the two types of inspec-
tions. While care must be taken in interpreting this result because the sample size is rela-
tively low, it suggests that sampling inspections may not be worth their added costs.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS IN REDUCING DISCHARGE
LEVELS (MQAVG) OF INSPECTIONS ON SOURCES OUT OF
COMPLIANCE VERSUS SOURCES IN COMPLIANCE
COEFFICIENTS
VARIABLE* Equation (1) Equation (2)
IPVIOI -1,436.733 - 1,606.712
(861.402) (850.242)
IPNOVIOI -766.114 -922.998
(572.448) (560.809)
IPVIO2 676.362 ...
(810.234) ...
IPNOVIO2 712.996 ...
(567.250) ...
NOT.-Standard errors are in parentheses.
* For ease of exposition, the coefficients of all the other variables in
the equation are not recorded. These variables are identical to those in
Table 3.
nificant, so that the inspections reduce pollution levels irrespective of the
compliance status.
The point estimates are consistent with one's expectations concerning
the relative magnitude of the effects, as the reductions achieved for firms
out of compliance are almost double those that are produced for firms not
in violation of their permit. For example, from equation (2) we have the
result that a source out of compliance was associated with a 684 (= 1,607
- 923) pound per day greater decrease in BOD discharge levels than a
source in compliance. It should be noted, however, that the standard
errors of the coefficients imply that the 95 percent confidence intervals for
the IPVIO1 coefficient and the IPNOVIOl coefficient overlap, so that this
result should be treated with appropriate caution.
Effects on the Incidence of DMR Nonreporting
While our econometric results in the beginning of this section clearly
point to the conclusion that plant inspections cause firms to both reduce
their pollutant discharge levels and come more closely into compliance
with their discharge permits, inspections do serve other purposes as well.
One of these is to induce firms to report more regularly their discharge
levels to the EPA or the designated state enforcement agency. We now
examine whether inspections tended to reduce the incidence of DMR
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TABLE 6
MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF DMR REPORTS BEFORE AN INSPECTION AND THE
NUMBER OF DMR REPORTS AFTER AN INSPECTION
Number of Months of
Possible DMR Data prior Mean Difference Averaged
to and after Inspection across All Inspections in Period
I. Four months:
a. May 1977-November 1984 -. 386 (.060)
b. May 1982-November 1984 -. 425 (.108)
2. Six months:
a. July 1977-September 1984 -. 714 (.090)
b. July 1982-September 1984 -. 868 (.173)
3. Twelve months:
a. January 1978-March 1984 -2.107 (.196)
b. January 1983-March 1984 - 1.693 (.477)
NOTE.-Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.
nonreporting as measured by the fraction of months without DMR entries
in the PCS data base.
30
Table 6 suggests that there is such a reporting effect for the firms in our
sample. The first line in the table measures the difference between the
number of months that DMR data was submitted in the four months prior
to an inspection and the number of months with DMR data in the four
months immediately following the inspection, averaged across all inspec-
tions in one of two periods, May 1977-November 1984 and May 1982-
November 1984. The second line reports the analogous differences for a
six-month period before and after the inspections, while the third line
provides results for a twelve-month period of DMR data. All six mean
differences are negative and more than two standard errors away from
zero, indicating high levels of statistical significance. Thus, the com-
pleteness of DMR reporting is clearly higher after inspections.
We must add one note of caution in interpreting these statistics because
the mean differences are not adjusted for the trend of increased reporting
of DMR data. Still, this trend could not explain much of this difference.
30 As the discussion in Section III explained, missing DMR data can result either from the
failure of firms to report the data to EPA regions or the states or from the failure of the
regions or states to enter the reports in the PCS data base. While the first type of failure
is probably more closely related to noncompliance than the second type, both reasons
for missing PCS data on the DMRs make the PCS system less useful for monitoring en-
forcement.
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To be conservative, consider the first line of the table reporting four
months of DMR data, where the trend ought to be least important. For
both the long and short periods, the mean difference averages about
-0. 10 reports per month, which implies that inspections cause one addi-
tional month of DMR data to be reported out of every ten months. If the
underlying trend of increased reporting accounted for, say, half of this
difference (that is, -0.05), then less than twenty months would have to
pass before no more nonreporting of DMR data would occur. Since the
period from May 1977 to November 1984 (line a) contains eighty-four
months, the underlying trend must be negligible relative to the rates
of increased reporting of DMR data implied by the mean differences in
Table 5.
Thus, inspections did tend to cause increased reporting of DMR data
into the PCS data base by the firms in our sample, which in turn allows the
EPA to more accurately monitor, and therefore enforce, its water pollu-
tion standards.
V. EXPLORATORY BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES
One might conclude that EPA inspections are successful because all
three of our measures of firms' responses to inspections show significant
effects. From a social welfare perspective, however, this question re-
quires valuing the benefits of the effluent reductions induced by an inspec-
tion and comparing these benefits to the full costs of each inspection. In
what follows, we provide a preliminary exploration of the components of
such a benefit-cost analysis. Unfortunately, the existing estimates of the
benefits per ton of BOD eliminated per year are only approximate, and we
could find no estimates of the compliance costs due to an inspection. As a
result, this exercise is highly imprecise. Nevertheless, it does provide
some perspective on the welfare consequences of the EPA inspection
program for industrial water pollution.
Vaughan and Russell 31 have estimated the national benefits from the
improvements in freshwater quality due to the BPT standards at $683
million (in 1980 dollars). While this estimate includes both the out-of-
pocket expenses and the opportunity costs of the time of fishermen, it
does not include the aesthetic benefits of fishing on cleaner waters, or
other benefits such as those from swimming and boating. Development
Planning and Resource Associates 32 estimated that the BPT standards
3' William J. Vaughan & Clifford S. Russell, Freshwater Recreational Fishing: The Na-
tional Benefits of Water Pollution Control 161 (1982).
32 Development Planning and Resource Associates, Inc., National Benefits of Achieving
the 1977, 1983, and 1985 Water Quality Goals (1976).
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would reduce BOD discharges by 3,390,233 tons per year, which together
with the previous estimate implies an average value of benefits per ton of
BOD removed due to the BPT standards of $201.46.
Using equation (4) in Table 3, each inspection will tend to cause a
reduction in BOD discharges of 1,148 pounds per day, or 209.51 tons per
year. Given the previous benefits estimate of $201.46 per ton, this implies
that an average inspection produces $42,208 of benefits every year. 33
Given the 0.982 coefficient of the MQAVG variable lagged four quar-
ters in equation (4) in Table 3, the effectiveness of an inspection in main-
taining lower effluent discharge levels decays at a negligible rate. Accept-
ing the linear form of the equation and rounding this coefficient to 1.0, the
equation implies that any BOD reductions from an inspection remain in
force for years after the inspection. Thus, we can approximate the an-
nualized benefits per inspection at $42,208.
Given the mix of inspections in our sample of 43 percent compliance
sampling inspections (requiring approximately thirty days) and 57 percent
compliance evaluation inspections (requiring approximately three days),
an average inspection required 14.6 days. Assuming the full cost of in-
spectors to be $50,000 per year over 220 working days yields a cost of
$227 per day, or $3,315 per inspection. Figuring this inspection cost at a
10 percent discount rate gives an annual cost of $332. 3 4 Calculating the net
inspection cost from the benefits gives an adjusted annualized benefit of
$41,876 per inspection.
Consider now whether the average annual compliance costs incurred
due to inspections are likely to exceed $41,876 per inspection. Since 75
percent of the firms sampled were already in compliance, we would ex-
pect them to spend little or nothing after an inspection. Thus, each non-
complying firm must spend at least four times $41,876, or $167,504, per
year in order that the costs associated with an inspection exceed their
benefits.
Whether compliance costs exceed this threshold probably hinges on
whether the firm must make a capital investment to attain compliance or
whether a change in operating procedures will suffice. Although detailed
13 This calculation assumes that the average benefits of each pound of BOD removed due
to an inspection equal the nationwide average benefits of the BPT standards. This simpli-
fying assumption ignores the fact that the effluent reductions at some plants induced by
inspections will yield benefits much greater than the average, whereas inspections at other
plants, even if they result in lower emissions, will improve water quality much less than for
an average inspection. Without more disaggregated information about benefits, we were
forced to make this simplifying assumption.
34 The use of a 10 percent discount rate is required by the Office of Management and
Budget, but other more realistic rates would not significantly affect our conclusions.
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cost data are not available for all portions of the pulp and paper indus-
try, some suggestive statistics are available for the costs of an activated
sludge treatment system used to comply with the BPT standards in the
wastepaper-molded products subcategory of the industry.3 5
For a concrete example, focus on the intermediate-size plant (45 kg/
day). Compliance for these firms entails an annual operation and mainte-
nance outlay of $113,000, annual energy cost of $19,000, and an aver-
age annual capital cost of $339,000, leading to a total annual cost of
$471,000.36 If compliance following an inspection involves only the opera-
tion and maintenance costs, the expenditure of $132,000 is somewhat
below the value of benefits less inspection costs. However, if a capital
investment is required, the costs exceed the pollution reduction benefits
net of enforcement costs by a factor of almost three.
For small plants, with a total annual compliance cost (including amor-
tized capital costs) of $288,000, the compliance costs outweigh benefits
once capital costs are included. For large wastepaper-molded products
plants with average annual compliance costs of $879,000, even the opera-
tion and maintenance costs of $176,000 exceed the pollution reduction
benefits. 37
To the extent that the rough estimates in this particular case reflect the
costs and the benefits for other industry subcategories, the following con-
clusion holds. If inspections lead firms to make substantial capital invest-
ments, then the costs of compliance exceed the benefits. Once having
made these investments, firms may be more likely to undertake the appro-
priate operating procedures to maintain their compliance status as a result
of an inspection. This promotion of continued vigilance on the part of
firms that have already made the required capital investment is more
likely to pass a benefit-cost test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Compared with other health, safety, and environmental regulations,
EPA water pollution regulations for the pulp and paper industry represent
an unusual success story. The EPA sets standards for which compliance
" While wastepaper-molded product is only one of many subcategories in the industry,
the activated sludge treatment system represents a standard technology for biological treat-
ment of pulp and paper mill wastes.
36 All the cost estimates are found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Develop-
ment Document for Effluent Guidelines and Standards for the Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard
and the Builders' Paper and Board Mills (1982).
37 See U.S. EPA, supra note 36.
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is feasible and then enforces these standards relatively vigorously, with
inspections averaging one per year for our sample. This mix is the oppo-
site of OSHA's, which has stringent standards coupled with weak en-
forcement. The coupling of regulations for which compliance is feasible
with stringent enforcement is likely to create strong incentives for com-
pliance, and the available evidence bears this out. Inspections and their
associated enforcement actions have a strong effect on both pollution
levels and rates of compliance with the permit levels. In addition, inspec-
tions are associated with less nonreporting of pollutant discharge levels.
Judged with respect to its legislative mandate to improve water quality,
this effort is clearly a success.
In view of the evident effectiveness of the water pollution enforcement
effort, one might well ask whether U.S. water quality should not have
improved overall as a result of such efforts. This may not be a meaningful
test, however, since the real issue is whether water quality would have
been worse in the absence of EPA enforcement, not whether the overall
level of water quality has improved. With economic growth, the baseline
rate of total discharge of BOD should be increasing. Coupled with a fixed
assimilative capacity of any body of water, this growth implies that there
should be deteriorating water quality in the absence of EPA actions.
Available information on national surface water quality trends shows
modest improvements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Council on
Environmental Quality reported in their fifteenth annual report that
"significant progress has been achieved in cleaning up the nation's wa-
ters. " 38 This conclusion is based on an assessment by the Association of
State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators (ASIWPCA)
of the degree to which beneficial uses were supported in surface waters
assessed in each state. The ASIWPCA reported that in 1982 64 percent of
assessed surface waters supported their designated uses, compared with
36 percent of 1972.39 In their 1986 Report to Congress, the EPA reported
that 74 percent of assessed river miles fully supported their designated
uses. 40
These results are consistent with the conclusions of the ASIWPCA and
the EPA in their report, The States' Evaluation of Progress, 1972-1982.
Based on an evaluation of 42 percent of the nation's streams, they re-
" Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: 15th Annual Report 85
(1984).
"9 Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: 17th Annual Report C-42
(1986).
40 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventory: 1986 Re-
port to Congress 2 (1986).
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ported that, between 1972 and 1982, 47,000 miles of assessed streams
improved in quality while 11,000 miles declined.4 '
Available data are insufficient to assess changes in ambient BOD levels
of an annual or regional basis; however, the Council on Environmental
Quality reported that BOD discharges from pulp and paper mills de-
creased from 706.8 thousand tons in 1974 to 207.6 thousand tons in 1984.42
One might raise the more general issue not treated by the EPA's en-
abling legislation: whether the benefits accruing from this pollution reduc-
tion are commensurate with their costs. This calculation needs substan-
tially better data to refine it, but some preliminary observations are in
order. If one includes only the operation and maintenance cost associated
with pollution control, then the benefits of inspections may exceed their
costs. If capital costs are included as well, the results are probably re-
versed. One major difficulty associated with this calculation is that we
cannot distinguish which incremental pollution control expenditures are
associated with the effect of the inspections. Notwithstanding these cave-
ats, it appears that the EPA water pollution regulations represent a dra-
matic departure from the apparent impotence of most other forms of
health, safety, and environmental regulation. The remaining challenge is
to set standards at a level that will ensure 'that the regulations are in
society's best interests.
"' Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 38, at 82-83.
42 Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 39, at C-38.
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